Tag Archives: Tory

Osborne’s budget: revenge of trickledown economics

George Osborne’s budget shows that we are not ‘all in it together’, writes Eddie Ford (first published in the Weekly Worker)

Budgets ain’t what they used to be. Once upon a time the chancellor and his colleagues were expected to maintain a state of strict purdah. Every chance meeting between a treasury official and a journalist had to be formally reported during the weeks before the statement. Hugh Dalton, the Labour chancellor, was forced to resign in 1947 because, whilst walking to the House of Commons to give the autumn budget address, he made an off-the-cuff remark to a journalist hinting at some of the tax changes to be made – which were then printed in the early edition of the evening papers before he even had time to complete his speech and while the stock markets were still open. Scandal. Dalton resigned.

Whether sadly or not, those days are almost certainly long gone. Pre-budget leaking is now a long established political pastime, almost an obligatory ritual. This year though the numbers of leaks was unprecedented. But the reason for that is fairly obvious: the scramble for credit within the coalition government, as Liberal Democrats and Tories both try to show their supporters they are fighting their corners. The Liberal Democrats want to prove that they are not Tories and the Tories want to prove that they are not Liberal Democrats. Also, when it comes to anything that might potentially impact upon the wealthy, the Tories find leaking a useful way of discovering what their backers think – not least those individuals who donate so generously to the Conservative Party.

Distorted

George Osborne’s budget was essentially one for the wealthy – hardly astonishing, given that over 20 cabinet members are millionaires. The basic assumption was that those at the top of society are the wealth-creators and hence need to be incentivised – lots of carrots – to encourage them to create yet more ‘wealth’ (ie, make larger profits and grow even richer). Given this grotesque premise, tax cuts – personal and corporate – are a vital necessity if we are to unleash a wave of entrepreneurship that will in turn create jobs for those languishing at the bottom.

Meanwhile, the working class and the poor find themselves at the wrong end of below-inflation increases to the minimum wage, less generous tax credits, regional differentials in public sector pay, and so on. In other words, the budget saw the unwelcome return – or revenge – of trickle-down economics. Not that it had ever gone away, of course.

The budget flagship, at least for the Tories, was the reduction in the top-rate of tax from 50p to 45p – so party time for Britain’s richest 300,000 households. Indeed, it would have been further reduced to 40p if Osborne had got his way – he told the treasury select committee on March 27 that he had not assigned a “special status” to the 45p rate, which would be kept under “review”. But the idea was blocked by David Cameron and Nick Clegg, the latter saying he would only accept a 40p rate if a ‘mansion tax’ on properties worth more than £2 million was introduced – something rejected out of hand by the prime minister. Cameron likes to look after his buddies.

Osborne disingenuously argued that the 50p rate had “distorted” the economy by “encouraging” tax avoidance. Presumably the poor, downtrodden super-rich had no choice but to employ armies of extremely well remunerated accountants and financial advisers to exploit every tax loophole (but it hurt them to do so). Osborne surely missed an opportunity to develop this logic to its fullest extent and declare that from now onwards the rich would not have to pay any income tax at all. That way, no more ‘distortions’ would be introduced into the economy and the rich could finally enjoy guilt-free sleep.

Cutting the top rate of tax down to 45p, Osborne argued, would only cost the exchequer £100 million – given that the current rate “raises at most a fraction of what we were told” and, in fact, “may raise nothing at all”. But a recent HMRC report he referenced indicated that the 50p tax rate raised £1 billion in its first year (2010-11) – far less than the £2.6 billion originally predicted, admittedly, but this was mainly due to people ‘forestalling’; that is, being paid early ahead of the introduction of the 50p rate in April 2010 in order to avoid paying it. But “nothing at all”?

Further defending top-rate reduction before the treasury select committee, Osborne posited that “dynamic modelling” suggested the 45p rate was likely to lead to a smaller loss of revenue than retaining the current rate. His calculation is based on the economic model known as the Laffer Curve, which hypothesises that under a 0% rate no tax is paid and at 100% no tax is paid either because no-one will bother working: therefore the trick is to locate a midway point that will optimise income.

According to basic arithmetic, the cost of cutting the top rate will be £3 billion in the first year, rising to £4 billion by 2016-17. But Osborne would have us believe that the net cost would fall to just £100 million or so thanks to the extra revenue from wealthier people working harder and harder – by the sweat of their brow – and gratefully bringing ‘home’ their monies stashed away offshore now that we have a “competitive top rate of tax”. Voodoo economics, UK-style. Straining credibility even further, Osborne asserted that, taking into account such calculations, the rich (people like himself, for instance) would end up paying five times more tax as a result of all the measures taken in the budget. Naturally, the chancellor said that his budget was “unashamedly” pro-business and would help the country “earn its way in the world”.

Another major plank of the budget was the imposition of a 7% stamp duty on properties worth more than £2 million – with immediate effect. Currently the tax is levied at 5% for all properties over £1million. Additionally, the duty on residential properties over £2 million which were purchased via an offshore company would increase from a paltry 0.5% to 15% – leading some to describe it, approvingly or not, as a “workable” mansion tax. Yet, obviously, this new rate would only affect a small number of properties, owned by the likes of Sir Mick Jagger and Ringo Starr – or Russian oligarchs.

For example, the latest statistics from the Land Registry showed that in November 2011 there were 121 homes sold for more than £2 million in England and Wales – accounting for just 0.2% of the 57,967 homes sold that month. Under the current system, if all those people paid stamp duty – a highly unlikely eventuality – it would raise £142.2 million. At 7% it would raise to £198.8 million, an additional £56.8 million. Not exactly staggering amounts of money. In reality, it is extremely doubtful whether the treasury will be able to collect the extra stamp duty from the Russian oligarchs, oil sheikhs, bankers, private consultants, rock stars Hollywood actors, footballers, etc – famous for their creativity when it comes to avoiding tax.

And, of course, what the chancellor takes from the rich with one hand he gives back with another. Hence on page 63 of the red book he sneaked in an inheritance tax exemption for non-domiciled individuals. Presently, a taxpayer domiciled in the UK can transfer their entire £325,000 inheritance tax allowance to their spouse if they are also based in Britain. This figure is reduced to £55,000 if a UK taxpayer makes a transfer to a spouse who is not domiciled in the UK. Osborne said he would increase this, though has so far declined to set a figure.

‘Granny tax’

Just about the biggest budget fuss has been over the so-called ‘granny tax’. Citing the need to “simplify” pensions, Osborne intends to freeze age-related allowances (ie, the amount of income that is tax-free) for half of Britain’s pensioners by the end of the parliament. The treasury says this will bring an extra 230,000 into the income tax system, saving the government £1 billion by 2015.

Currently, the allowance is £8,105 for those under 65 (changing to £9,205 in the 2013-14 financial year), £10,500 for those aged 65 to 74, and £10,660 for those aged 75 and over. However, this ‘extra’ allowance is gradually withdrawn from those pensioners with a taxable income of between £24,000 and £29,000 – about 10% of all pensioners – and anyone with an income of more than £100,000 has all their personal allowance gradually withdrawn regardless of age.

Practically meaning that from now on anyone turning 65 after April 5 2013 will get the same personal allowance as the under-65s, but someone who turns 65 just before the same date will still get the £10,500 personal allowance. As for people on the basic state pension and pension credit (some 50% of all pensioners), they do not earn enough to pay income tax, so will be unaffected by the changes. They constitute about 50% of pensioners. Therefore that leaves a middle stratum of pensioners whose income is likely to be made up of a combination of state and private pensions, as well as some money in savings accounts – the near mythological decent, hard-working, ‘responsible’ pensioners who have ‘done the right thing’ all their lives. Prudently saved a bit each month and loyally voted Tory each election – possibly. This large grouping might well feel the tax goalposts have suddenly been moved, leaving them with less than they might have expected. The treasury’s own statistics show that, taking inflation into account, Osborne’s measures will leave 4.41 million people worse off by an average of £83 a year come 2013-14.

Under the budget we can see that we are not “all in this together” – always a cynical lie. While the top 10% of earners and the super-rich with their Mayfair pads will certainly gain, the poorest will lose the most. A living insult to the unemployed, disabled, poor pensioners and the 200,000 part-time workers, who are having their tax credits snatched away this April. That is when the qualification threshold is raised from 16 hours to 24 hours – at a time when the bosses are slashing employees’ hours due to the economic environment. Resulting in a grim situation where low-income families with parents in part-time work, more often than not because they could not find full-time employment, could lose nearly £4,000 per year. How are they in the same boat as Elton John or, for that matter, everyone sat round the cabinet table?

The entire budget is a monument to the government’s blatant failure to deliver its central promise. The coalition commitment to getting rid of the deficit within its first term was premised on a 2%-3% growth rate, but that now looks like a fantasy figure. The recession in the US and Europe, combined with the government’s own suicidal austerity programme, has seen government spending increase, as it forks out ever more money in the form of unemployment benefit, housing benefit, etc (even after the cuts in these areas).

Bluntly, it is almost a statistical fluke that the UK is not technically in recession. Outside of Osborne’s fiscal Alice in Wonderland, the prospects for the economy are bleak – something confirmed by figures published by the Office for National Statistics on March 28. The economy contracted by 0.3% between October and December last year, more than the 0.2% drop previously estimated by the ONS and other economists. That left growth for the year as a whole at just 0.7% – down on the 0.8% originally pencilled in. Furthermore, the ONS said real household disposable incomes in 2011 as a whole fell 1.2%, the biggest drop since 1977.

Not exactly a sign of roaring success, George.

eddie.ford@weeklyworker.org.uk

Advertisements

MPs’ expenses: scams, yoghurts and loopholes

James Turley explains that taking a worker’s wage is not a moral commitment, but a thoroughly political one

cash2It has been simmering for long enough, and now it has exploded. The question of MPs’ expenses, which has surfaced periodically over the years, has reached a new level since the leak to The Daily Telegraph of the detailed claims of all MPs.

On top of a not inconsiderable basic salary of £64,766, MPs are entitled to a raft of expenses. Chief among these is the second home allowance – MPs for constituencies outside London are entitled to claim money in order to maintain a second household in the capital for parliamentary business. Not disastrously unreasonable, on the face of it … but it has become public knowledge in the past that ‘outside London’ included such remote provincial outposts as Watford.

And now we have before us the full picture of how much money can be squeezed out of the second home allowance. For example, Margaret Moran, a Labour MP, claimed for repairs to her Southampton home – all very well, except her constituency is in Luton, and the purpose of the Southampton outpost is to have a pad closer to her partner’s place of work.

Additionally, the rules do not designate exactly which of your homes – constituency or London – counts as the second. This allows MPs to claim for mundane renovation works on their first homes, but more prominently, also allows them to switch which home they are claiming for with a few days’ notice – a practice that has now become known as ‘flipping’. MPs do not have to pay stamp duty on their second home, and a gaping loophole allows them to avoid paying capital gains tax on either of their homes.

At the other end of the scale, MPs are given broad licence to claim for the most banal trivia. Shaun Woodward, the Northern Ireland secretary, has the dubious honour of having claimed 38p for a Muller Crunch Corner yoghurt. It is perhaps unsurprising that a most infamous opportunist should win the wooden spoon for pettiest use of the tax purse – Woodward crossed the floor from the Tories to Labour in 1999 (but his history is more chequered still: at Cambridge University, he had been under the influence of Marxist professors, studying under Stephen Heath and active in the campaign in defence of Colin MacCabe, who was effectively fired for conciliation to Continental intellectual fashions on a broadly Althusserian basis).

What has been made clear in the last week is precisely what a lash-up bourgeois politics really is. Without distinction of party, all-comers have been revealed as most adept players of the system; it is clear that this substantial supplement to a generous salary (anyone could be forgiven for thinking £64,776 a pittance!) has simply become taken for granted. It is clear, furthermore, that young, new MPs are integrated into the systematic corruption remarkably quickly. The response from politicians has resembled that of a child who has been caught doing something wrong, but is nevertheless entirely surprised.

One would expect, all things considered, the scorn to fall on all major parties equally. Indeed, David Cameron has been relatively reticent in taking pot-shots at the government, fully aware of his own vulnerability on this score. Yet the Tory leader has been remarkably astute in making the best of a bad situation.

Outside the context of Brown-bashing, he has been ruthlessly efficient in making political capital out of the confusion. He condemned his own front bench MPs for extravagant claims; more impressively, he appears to have moderated his own reliance on the public purse upon assuming the Tory leadership in 2005 – a most remarkable case of foresight for a legendarily opportunistic politician (The Guardian May 12). Most spectacularly of all, he has demanded that leading Tory MPs give up their perks and pay back the money.

By contrast, Labour seems utterly directionless. Brown has apologised on the behalf of the entire political class, but made no serious attempt to rival Cameron’s pursuit of ‘reparations’. The speaker of the House of Commons, Michael Martin, is a long-standing Labourite (though tradition demands he puts his party affiliation to one side). He has become emblematic of Labour’s confusion over the issue: at the critical Commons debate, he devolved into incoherent ranting, accusing Labour dissident Kate Hoey of simply feeding “quotes to the press” after she questioned the wisdom of calling the police in to investigate the leak. He made similar allegations against the Liberal Democrat Norman Baker. Douglas Carswell, a Tory who has been more critical of the speaker than his party at large, is now engaged in tabling a motion of no confidence … and who can blame him?

It should be emphasised that this is not an index of the moral superiority of the Tories as against Labour. All are waist-deep in muck. It does tell us something about the dynamism of a Conservative Party on a high, despite a basically and obviously shallow leadership, as against an ideologically bereft Labour government in decay. Brown is increasingly seen as a deadweight – where Cameron has reacted swiftly and effectively to the public outcry, the prime minister has seemed at every moment a step behind. It is not insignificant that Polly Toynbee, a social democrat who urged us all to get behind Gordon through the Blair years, now openly calls for an internal coup to replace him with health secretary Alan Johnson (The Guardian May 12).

Beyond the immediate questions of party politics, the expenses scandal is merely an eye-opener. It seems, to the politicians, perfectly natural to screw the taxpayer for yoghurts – and, on one level, it is. Bourgeois politics operates on a career structure. Politics is reduced to a job, and elected officials to functionaries.

Why should they not attempt to screw every last penny to which they are entitled? What would anyone else do in the same position? Given the basically insignificant political differences between the major parties at this time, the essentially venal character of the political system is not only foregrounded; it is revealed as the entire character of its functioning. The question is not whether you are on the gravy train, but how much gravy you are getting out of it.

There is a more fundamental question here. Bourgeois politicians are not directly beholden to any particular constituency. The system is not designed to produce iron discipline among all its participants, but workable political outcomes in the broader picture. While bourgeois parties do enforce a limited degree of discipline on their representatives, the latter are loyal on a more fundamental level to capitalism, to its preservation and its strength. The expenses gravy train is precisely a way of ensuring loyalty – both as a compelling career aim for the politicians of the future, and as an ongoing reward for those of the present. What presents itself to the general population as a competition between political strategies is in reality a competition for sponsorship from above, in which a second home at the expense of Joe Taxpayer constitutes one element of the reward.

The priority of communists is quite different. For us, parliamentary politics is not a carefully designed game, but a twofold opportunity: to expose our enemies and propagate our programme. The exposition of our enemies is not rocket science – but the matter of positive propaganda poses more subtle problems. The programme is embodied in the party; for parliamentary representatives to be reliably subordinated to the programme requires them to be subordinated to the party.

For this reason, communists commit ourselves unconditionally to the principle of a worker’s wage for a workers’ representative – a principle which should be imposed on representatives of bourgeois parties too. We are unswayed by the arguments of the likes of George Galloway, to the effect that public political activism incurs significant costs. There certainly are legitimate expenses to be incurred over and above the £22,000-odd a skilled worker’s wage amounts to – but if these funds are not in the possession of the party, the MP (or councillor, MEP, etc) will begin to act as a free agent rather than the servant of the working class. (Certainly, Marxists have no problem in screwing the system for all it is worth – provided that the resultant funds go to the movement rather than the individual pockets of representatives.)

The Galloways of this world, no doubt, commit the bulk of their funds to advocacy of progressive causes – or at least causes that they believe to be progressive. But in operating outside of party discipline, they operate outside of the mechanisms the working class has to hold its representatives to account. Galloway here converges on the position of every rightwing social democrat, who invariably refuse any party discipline to their left in the name of some higher moral calling – usually the ‘millions out there’ who do not trouble themselves with the internal politics of the workers’ parties.

Communists refuse such hypocrisy, and we scorn the crass attempts of the bourgeois establishment to buy us off and integrate us into its political machine. The worker’s wage is not a moral commitment, but a thoroughly political one – it touches on the very vision of politics we propose, and hints at a way out of the one we are saddled with. That bourgeois politicians are as corrupt as the class they defend should surprise no-one.

Budget: spinning, not turning

Capitalism is in decline. If anyone doubts it, the budget should persuade them, writes Mike Macnair

budget-2009-comment-50p-tax-is-political-posturing-$7032220$300The media response to last week’s budget has been dominated by complaints about the proposed new 50p in the pound (50%) tax band for incomes above £150,000 a year. This is a significant symptom of the current shape of the British political order. But it is perhaps equally noteworthy how little actually changes from budget to budget, compared to the level of spin.

Both, in different ways, tell us that British capitalist governments’ room for manoeuvre is now very limited. We are living under a capitalism ‘revived’ by state-based artificial means, which is actually a symptom of capitalist decline – like similar regimes in the later phases of earlier class societies.

50p whinge

Since the ‘credit crunch’ began to bite, the Tory leadership has pursued fairly consistently the theme that Labour has worsened the UK’s position by irresponsible borrowing and public sector spending and that the Tories will bring in a new ‘thrift’ in government. The Tory leadership’s response to the budget was more of the same: Cameron called at the weekend for a “new age of austerity”.1

The basic appeal of this line is to the Tories’ core activist support and electoral vote: the self-employed, small business people and farmers who have to balance their own books; pensioners whose fixed incomes are eroded by tax and rate rises; and traditional rentiers. More broadly, the ideas appeal – like many Tory ideas – to the politics of nostalgia for a pre-capitalist patriarchal world of farmers and small-town artisans. The more generic version – that Labour is incompetent in dealing with the economy – is beginning to catch on in wider layers. Labour has been in office for more than a decade and it is normal to blame the government when things go wrong in the economy.

It is, then, at first sight surprising that the predominantly Tory press has been diverted off this line by what can only be called a sustained whinge from the media about the new 50p tax band. Columnists attacking it directly are backed by the journos finding some businesses, and some celebs like Michael Caine, to say that they will leave the country rather than pay, and some ‘experts’ to announce that the new band will reduce the total tax take due to increased evasion and avoidance.2 The Blairites have joined the chorus, with Tony Blair himself letting it be known that he opposes the idea and Stephen Byers speaking against it.3

The overall effect has been to drown Cameron and Osborne’s message of ‘austerity’ and ‘thrift’ in a chorus of complaint about the ‘return of old Labour’ and the ‘politics of envy’.

Very few people have incomes above £150K to bring them into the new 50p band: around 350,000 out of the UK’s 49 million over the age of 16, or 0.7%, and less than 1% of people eligible to vote.4 Some of the most prominent in the last period have been the ‘City boys’ who are widely held responsible for the crisis.

Hence the media whinge looks on its face like very incompetent electoral politics, and exactly what Brown and Darling were hoping for when they made the proposal. That is, that the Tories will smear themselves as opponents of the rich bearing their fair share of the costs of the crisis. While the Tory leadership itself has been aware of the trap and avoided premature commitments to reversing the change, the Tory press has been less restrained.

So why is it happening? The simplest and most cynical answer is that some senior journos on the national dailies and other ‘media people’ are grossly overpaid (like the City boys), so that the 50p band will actually hit them personally. To say that this answer is cynical is not necessarily to say that it is wrong. But there are more fundamental issues at stake.

Overpaid journos

In the first place, to say that media types on upwards of £150K per year are “grossly overpaid” seems an odd statement. We live in capitalist society, so surely pay is simply fixed by the labour market (or rather the particular branch of the labour market)? And aren’t these media types bringing in readers/viewers/listeners, and with them advertisers, and thereby helping their employers to make large profits, from which the employers can afford the large salaries?

At one level these arguments are simply false in free-market terms. A recent article by John Thanassoulis in The Economists’ Voice argues that the bankers’ bonus culture was a ‘market failure’. The traders in stock and other financial markets would naturally seek the employers offering the largest share in the profits they generated by their market judgements: ie, the best bonuses. Banks were in competition for these traders with hedge funds; but hedge funds, because of their specialisation, did not need to carry the same capital base as banks, so could afford more risk. Hence, in order to remain competitive with hedge funds in the financial markets, the banks were forced to offer traders bonuses which incentivised the taking of ever-larger risks; this led to the banks carrying risks they could not afford. Shareholders, being dispersed and lacking relevant information, could not practically force the banks’ management to take on less risk. Since free-market incentives here create irrational results (‘market failure’), Thanassoulis argues that regulation of financial pay schemes is justified.5

I give this argument not to support it, but simply to make the point that the mere fact that there is a jobs ‘market’ in a ‘labour’ sub-sector does not imply in itself that the prices paid in this sub-market are justified in free-market terms.

In Marxist terms the point is somewhat different. The basic value of labour is the average cost of reproduction of unskilled or semi-skilled labour. Above this, there is a value premium on skilled labour, which reflects the socially necessary cost of reproduction of sufficient labourers having the relevant skill. This value premium includes both the cost of training time and some sufficient incentive payment to induce enough people (mainly youth) to put in the training.

Above this, there may also be a price premium if the existing skills owners have enough control to limit entry. For example, the English legal professions, by insisting on apprenticeships as a requirement of qualification to practise (‘pupillage’ for barristers, ‘training contracts’ for solicitors) are able to create a bottleneck on entry which limits competition. The result is that legal fees and professional incomes are held well above free-market outcomes.

None of this would explain senior media types being paid above £150K. What is going on here is that a distribution of profit takes the ostensible form of wages/salary (this is openly recognised in Thanassoulis’s discussion of City traders). But then why should media organisations distribute profit to some favoured employees in the form of salary? It isn’t just media organisations, of course. The ‘fat cats’ of the newspaper cartoons are found in every large-scale business. They are almost entirely receiving profit in the ostensible form of salary; rather less frequently in the form of ‘consultancy fees’.

The immediate answer is that the tax system creates incentives for this form of distribution of profits. Most obviously, companies pay corporation tax on their income before distributing dividends to their shareholders. But, as far as the tax system is concerned, excessive salaries are not a distribution of profits, but a business expense which reduces the company’s tax liability. There are various other ways in which it is tax-advantageous for businesses to distribute profits in the form of salary rather than dividend. It also has the private-law advantage that dividends paid when the company is actually insolvent can be reclaimed by the liquidator in the interests of the creditors, but this is only very exceptionally true of salaries, pension pots, etc.

In a sense, this system is at the expense of the shareholders: even with the tax advantage, high salaries on the scale currently paid to management mean lower dividends. But in the modern world, who are the shareholders? Mostly institutions who hold shares as assets to back insurances, on behalf of pensioners and so on; a few large players; to a very much lesser extent, small private investors (again, largely pensioners). The managers of the institutions have every interest in going along with profits being distributed in the form of salaries; the large players will also hold directorships, etc; the small investors are both marginal and atomised, incapable of effective common action without backing from larger players.

The fact that the tax system works in this way is probably originally an accident. But it creates important social and political effects. In substance, excessive salaries buy loyalty. In terms of the ruling class, what is involved is the displacement of the individual capitalist (now almost invariably no more than a petty bourgeois) by corporate, institutional capitals. The human ruling group in society are now mainly managers who identify themselves with the corporate capitals they manage, since these supply them with a share of profits in the form of ‘salary’.

Overpaid journos are not in the same way part of the ruling group. Their overpayment is more like Thatcher’s immediate decision when she came to power in 1979 to raise police pay by 45%, to secure police loyalty for the conflicts she expected to follow.6 It is this media loyalty which is expressed by the mass whinge about the 50p band.

Loyalty to what, exactly? The answer is loyalty to the existing regime as it has developed: that is, to the corporatocracy – and to the major shift of increased inequality and reduction of the wage share of economic output that has developed since the 1980s, one of whose vehicles has been the reduction of top rates of tax. Overpaid media types may personally lose money through the 50p band. But what animates the great media whinge about it is just as much the fear that a cow that has been sacred since the 1980s – that the rich should pay less tax – might lose its sanctity.

Capital mobility

Like all effective ideology, the great whinge about the 50p tax band contains an element of truth. And this element of truth is that the new band will produce an increase in illegal evasion and the use of ‘legal’ ‘avoidance’ devices, and will produce at least some flight of capital. This, after all, was what happened in the 1970s (and had already begun in the 50s and 60s). The question this poses is how far the UK government – and other governments – are prepared to go to curb these devices.

Tax competition between states has been one of the dominant themes of the last 30 years. An important role in this competition is played by ‘tax havens’ or ‘offshore centres’: small states with small populations, incapable of defending themselves, which live by providing confidential financial services. Direct tax competition between large states is much less significant, because most such states have heavy expenditure commitments which they cannot abandon without collapse or revolutionary overthrow, and therefore cannot risk large-scale and rapid reductions in the total tax take.7

The fact that the tax havens – with the exception of Switzerland – are actually incapable of defending themselves is of some importance. It means that the system of tax havens and tax competition, which is against the interests of the large majority of states, exists because of the support of the US and to a lesser extent the US sidekick, the UK. Without that support, simply closing down the tax havens by military action would be low-cost and high-gain for most states. A significant number are British overseas territories: ie, remaining formal colonies.

The April G20 meeting promised some sort of crackdown on tax havens. But like all the G20’s promises, this was pretty vague, and the few countries targeted felt safe enough in making very limited moves towards cooperation with tax authorities in relation to illegal evasion – which is very narrow.

In this context the media whingers’ threat that the 50p tax band will lead to flight of the rich and of capital means one of two things. One possibility is that the whingers have not yet caught up with the brave new world post-credit crunch. The second, and far more likely, is that there is no brave new world. The G20 promises are mere posturing, like the OECD’s 1998 ‘Harmful tax competition’ report.8 The US and UK states, behind the political facades, continue to back the regime of tax havens and tax competition. Raising taxes on the rich will therefore continue to produce flight, evasion and avoidance.

That this is the case tells us something fundamental about the capitalists’ and their states’ perception of the world post-credit crunch. The immediate panic phase is over. While markets seemed to be in free fall and financial institutions were collapsing left, right and centre, there was all sorts of talk about a decisive break with neoliberalism and the post-1980s world order. As the bailouts and stimulus packages seem, for the moment at least, to have stabilised the financial institutions markets, this talk is coming to an end. We are moving – gradually – back towards ‘There is no alternative’.

This context limits the government’s room for manoeuvre. It cannot seriously tax the rich: that would require a reversal of global policy. Such a reversal would probably have the incidental effect of impoverishing the British state, since London is also – in some respects – an ‘offshore centre’.

It is going to have to raise taxes elsewhere and to make cuts. The problem is where these are going to come. The Budget report provides a long list of £35 billion worth of expected ‘efficiency gains’ to be made in “back-office functions” to preserve “front-line services”; but these are not seriously believed: such claims have been made repeatedly, not only by this government, but also by previous ones.9 Cameron’s promise of ‘austerity’ is mainly a promise of public expenditure cuts; but so far he and Osborne have been studiously avoiding saying what will be cut. This is partly a problem of avoiding political traps.10 But it is also a real problem of lack of room for manoeuvre in relation to government income and expenditure, which has affected Brown and Darling just as much.

Income

The media coverage of budgets has acquired over many years certain routine characteristics. It is all about spin. Government spin to sell itself to the electorate, and opposition spin to undermine the government.

Hence, it does not tell us real facts about government income and expenditure and the choices involved. It tells us about headline changes in tax rates (like the 50p band, or 13p on a bottle of spirits) or about government management of the economy – overall tax, borrowing and spending, and economic forecasts.

The Budget report does at least have some figures. They are buried in torrents of spin – the full report is 268 pages long and a high percentage of it is NuLabSpeak waffle. The categories are often misleading or insufficiently broken down. It is beyond both my skills and the available time to work out a proper breakdown and reconstruction. The Budget report does at least at an early stage provide outline pie charts of income and expenditure which are some use in indicating the nature of the problem (Figs 1 and 2).

On the income side, the overall tax take in 2008-09 fell by £11.2 billion (2.25%) as a result of the crash, and is expected to fall by a further 8% in 2009-10. Around 45% of income is provided by income tax and national insurance contributions on wages, expected to fall by 4%, while income tax on savings is reflected to fall more dramatically as a result of interest rate cuts – by 75%. Financial sector corporation tax fell by 32% in 2008-09 and is expected to fall further, to 40% of its 2007-08 level this year. North Sea revenues are expected to halve with the crash in the oil price (pp230-232).

Among the property and capital taxes, capital gains tax rose in 2008-09 as gains were reported in advance of a change in tax regime, but is also expected to fall sharply. Inheritance tax fell by 25% and is expected to fall further. Stamp duty receipts fell by 50% with the collapse in the property market and are also expected to fall further in 2009-10 (p232).

Rates and business rates, which fund local government activities, are included in the pie chart at p12, but not in the analysis of the tax take. The most striking feature is that the projected tax take from domestic rates is larger (£25 billion) than that for business rates (£24 billion). Though the document does not discuss this, the reason is that the non-domestic rate multiplier has since 1990, when the uniform business rate was introduced, been set lower than the rate of inflation. The real value of the business rate take has therefore consistently declined, with an increased share of local government spending being loaded on domestic rates. The UBR is also (like domestic rates) sharply regressive: that is, Tesco pays very substantially less per square metre than a corner shop does.

Among consumption taxes, VAT receipts fell sharply and are expected to fall by a further 19%. Petrol excise duty fell due to lower demand for fuel, though less dramatically, and the government expects to recoup the loss by raising the duty. Excise duty on alcohol actually rose in relation to the 2008 projection: evidently people treat booze as a necessity rather than a luxury in a recession (p233). Overall, government tax income is therefore quite badly squeezed, simply by the recession.

Socialist Worker’s response to the budget is to call for the government to “Take all the cash from the super-rich”: “Britain’s 1,000 most super-rich individuals are still swilling around in £258 billion … All their money should be taken off them. This, along with stopping military spending, could be used to fund our jobs and services, and ensure that ordinary people do not bear the brunt of the recession.”11

This makes for a catchy and populist slogan, but is hopeless political economy. Even if the holdings of the super-rich were liquid cash, £258 billion is slightly more than half the annual state tax take of £496 billion projected in the budget. The holding of the super-rich are, in other words, small beer relative to the state budget.

Moreover, the money values of the capital holdings of the super-rich are not “money” which, if “taken off them”, could simply be spent by government on jobs and services. Part is notional values on antiques, jewellery, stately homes, etc, which are only really worth anything as long as there are super-rich buyers for them. The real values among them are capitalised valuations of expected income streams from capital assets – rent on land, dividends on shares, interest on loans – on the assumption that capitalism will go on functioning as it is.

Generalised expropriation would leave the state with the land titles and shareholdings, but destroy the functioning of money as money, so that there would be short-term hyperinflation. What would then matter would be maintaining and controlling the material surplus product. This would pose utterly different ‘accounting problems’ to those of the budget.

Progressive taxation and specifically a graduated income tax are important ideas for communists to be promoting now. The reason is not their effectiveness in raising revenue, but the challenge they pose to the capitalists’ sanctification of property and inequality. To that extent, the 50p tax band is genuinely a positive move, for all that it is a token gesture. But the project of the revolutionary overthrow of the state does not consist in demanding that the Labourites should soak the rich more than they are doing. It is primarily about the working class taking control of the allocation of resources. And this is at the end of the day in the first place about political democracy and democratic control of the giant resources of the state and the corporations, not about super-rich individuals.

Expenditure

The Budget projects expenditure of £671 billion: an overall deficit of £175 billion for 2009-10. Where is the money going? The pie chart on p12 divides it ‘by function’ into 11 categories, one of which is “other”; pp238-39 has slightly more detail on the division between income spending and capital spending and the budgets of particular departments. The functional division probably obscures important facts, but is as far as I can usefully get for present purposes.

By order of size, the categories are as follows. The largest is ‘Social protection’, expected to claim £189 billion. This is another expression for the benefits system providing basic support for the unemployed, long-term sick and so on. The government is raising the total sum budgeted because it expects further large increases in unemployment. But at the same time it is attacking the existing unemployed through efforts to get people off the long-term sick and phoney workfare schemes.

A small note within this. A substantial element of the cost is housing benefit. The reason for the scale of this cost is two Thatcherite measures Blair-Brown have not repealed. The first is deregulation of the private rental sector (abolition of rent control). The effect is that the government, through housing benefit, supports private landlords under the pretence that there is a ‘market rent’.

The second is that local authorities are now required to charge ‘market rents’ for council houses. These are then paid … by the same local authorities in the form of housing benefit. The cost, in turn, falls largely on the central budget through government transfers to local authorities. Jobs are created for clerical workers and managers in housing management and housing benefit offices … by cycling money from government office to government office.

The second largest category is the health service, at £119 billion. Expenditure on the NHS has gone up dramatically in recent years. As with housing, there are budgetary problems attributable to New Labour’s neoliberal commitments and to its centralist control-freakery. These are expressed in the massive increase in NHS managerial costs over the last 10 years; in the amount wasted on league tables, etc, and on applications to special-purpose funds; and the enormous waste (and degradation of the end product) involved in the private finance initiative.

Third is education at £88 billion. PFIs are again relevant here and – because local government is involved – the waste of money and increase in costs produced by compulsory competitive tendering (CCT).

“Other” at £72 billion covers “spending on general public services; recreation, media, culture and sport; international cooperation and development; public service pensions; plus spending yet to be allocated and some accounting adjustments”. It would be helpful to have these disaggregated, especially since the Tory press is campaigning against public sector pensions as unduly generous: public sector pensions do not look like being on their own a really big-ticket item, and reducing them is likely to imply increasing other aspects of ‘social protection’ and ‘social care’ spending.

From here we fall abruptly to a group of items in the £20 billion-£40 billion range: defence at £38 billion; ‘public order and safety’ (police and fire services, etc) £35 billion; personal social services (mainly for the elderly) £31 billion; housing and environment £29 billion; debt interest £28 billion; transport £23 billion; industry, agriculture, employment and training £20 billion.

Cut where?

OK, if you were David Cameron and George Osborne, in charge after the 2010 election (I know this is a pretty repulsive idea), trying to make radical cuts in public spending, which sacred cow or cows of government spending would you slaughter?

The problem is simple. The actual evidence of CCT in local government, of ‘market reforms’ to the NHS, and of PFIs in the NHS, education and transport is that they increase the overall net cost to the taxpayer, while reducing the available frontline services. Their only benefit is profit creation for some construction companies and job creation for sections of the white-collar working class and the managerial middle class.

The compulsory insurance systems of medical care operated on the continent may provide better care, but they are actually more expensive per capita than the NHS was until recent marketising ‘reforms’. No-one (unless they had been paid off by a US health provider company) would wish to introduce the US fully private healthcare system. The unemployed are the obvious target, but in the first place their disposable income has already been squeezed very extensively, and in the second place to attack the housing benefit system would be to attack a significant part of the Tories’ base – the private landlords.

Further, almost any of the radical reforms that might be introduced to cut public expenditure would make the UK a less attractive place to do business: the employer would need to provide private healthcare or education systems, etc and/or – suppose that, for example, the unemployed were to be allowed to starve – to expect massive increases in property crime, communicable disease and public disorder. To make the UK more like a ‘third world’ country in terms of its welfare provision would thus make it unattractive to business, since it would then be in direct competition with actual ‘third world’ countries with their large peasantries and hence labour markets heavily skewed against labour.

Government – Labour or Tory – thus has very little room for manoeuvre. The Tories when they get in will certainly talk the talk of rolling back the frontiers of the state, and may try some pretty extreme measures (like the poll tax last time around). They will almost certainly make us all (except the very rich) worse off – and blame the ‘unfortunate necessity’ on Labour’s ‘poor stewardship’. But it is in the highest degree unlikely that they will actually roll back the frontiers of the state or actually reduce the overall tax burden. They will fiddle at the margins and spin to exaggerate the importance of what they are doing – like Blair and Brown.

Declining capitalism

The Budget report calculates overall UK GDP for 2008 at £1,275.3 billion – consisting of household consumption £830.3 billion, general government consumption £261.2 billion, fixed investment (both government and private) £219.5 billion, change in inventories £1 billion, exports of goods and services £350.9 billion, and less imports of goods and services £388.9 billion (p216). These figures are of limited value, but they give some partial indication of the sheer scale of the role of the state in the economy.

As an economic order declines, the state steps in to fill the gaps created by this decline and keep the old order alive, protecting the privileges of the old ruling class and holding down the subordinate classes. Classical antiquity was an economy of cities; the Roman empire created a system-wide state, but this state created and supported cities until it, too, collapsed.12 By the 16th century real feudalism, both in Europe and in Japan, was in decline. The result was not (except in the Netherlands and Britain) bourgeois revolution, but the creation of the absolutist state, regimes of state-sponsored feudalism, state-sponsored religion and state-sponsored guild corporations.

The real immobility of the budget and the dominance of hype about it on both sides of the political divide show that capitalism, at least in its heartlands, has reached this stage of development. Thatcherism-New Labourism is not a regime of healthy capitalism. It is a regime of state-based, artificial capitalism, like the state-based, artificial urbanism of the Roman empire or the state-based, artificial feudalism of absolutism or the Tokugawa Shogunate. The ship of state cannot turn from its course forward to increased dominance of the economy: it can only spin.

Under these conditions the problem is not to overthrow the decorative elite which signals to the state its own capitalist character – Socialist Worker’s “hyper-rich”. These people are merely ornaments. The problem is to overthrow the capitalist state and win real, working class, democratic control.

Notes

1. The Guardian April 27.
2. Celebs: see, for example, Daily Mail April 27; experts: The Sunday Telegraph April 26.
3. Blair: The Sunday Telegraph April 26; Byers: The Guardian April 28.
4. 350,000: estimate on www.thisismoney.co.uk/tax-advice/income-tax/article.html?in_article_id=483056&in_page_id=77&expand=true
49 million: from www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/xsdataset.asp?More=Y&vlnk=1327&All=Y&B2.x=101&B2.y=14
It is right to use the figures for people above 16 rather than the smaller 31 million figure for the UK labour force (between 16 and retiring age) because, of course, certain people above retiring age (like Michael Caine) will have incomes above £150K. The number eligible to vote is somewhat smaller because of 16-18-year-olds and resident non-citizens.
5. www.bepress.com/ev/vol6/iss5/art2
6. The Police Federation’s point of view at www.metfed.org.uk/news?id=326 ; the loyalty point from a Tory point of view: Philip Johnston, ‘Thatcher kept the police onside’ – blogs.telegraph.co.uk/philip_johnston/blog/2007/12/07/thatcher_kept_the_police_onside
7. Most of what will be found by Googling “tax competition” is US-based rightwing advocacy for the merits of tax competition. www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/ takes an anti-tax competition line. A 2004 IFS working paper attempts to analyse the extent to which tax changes in OECD countries have been driven by forms of tax competition: www.ifs.org.uk/wps/wp0405.pdf
8. RS Avi-Yonah, ‘The OECD harmful tax competition report: a 10th anniversary retrospective’, University of Michigan Law and Economics, Olin Working Paper No08-013 (2008) argues for some substantial results from the OECD report, but these are really no more than promises about cooperation.
9. www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/Budget2009/bud09_completereport_2520.pdf , Table 6.1, pp129-132.
10. Martin Kettle: www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/apr/26/conservatives-cameron-cheltenham
11. www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=17794 , posted April 28, dated May 2.
12. JHWG Liebeschuetz The decline and fall of the Roman city Oxford 2001.